After Bangkok: the Roadblocks on the way to Barcelona and Beyond

The UN climate negotiations finished in Bangkok last Friday. There were no fireworks, no closing fanfare, instead it was a protracted finish. The final plenary session continued for hours after it was meant to, as all countries took their last opportunity to take the mic.

I am in full support of everyone being heard, but, more than two hours into plenary, when there were still more than fifteen countries left to speak, I decided to leave. Poor form for a tracker, you may think, when my very role is to follow the negotiations!!

So, why did I leave?

Tracking the climate talks, just not to the repetitive end.

Well, it was clear that nothing new was going to be said. Without wanting to ignore the shades of grey in between, I was confident that the plenary would continue to be roughly two groupings of countries, the developed and the developing world, stating their different sides of the one “climate” coin.

To me, it seems that for developed countries, like Australia, climate change is approached as if it is a purely a technical issue, a divide up of who needs to do what, how they will do it, and with what tools.

Developing countries take the issue a little deeper. They are concerned with questioning, what has caused climate change? Why has climate change continued to increase? Are we all affected in the same way? And, who has the responsibility to act? They want climate change to be addressed as an issue of justice.

These differing sides played out largely like this: In the closing plenary many developed countries restated their “commitment to a global outcome in Copenhagen,” followed by a restatement of their un-ambitious emission reduction commitments, and then a call for developing economies (namely, China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Mexico) to “do more”.

On the flip side, developing countries, lead by the G77 + China and Least Developed Countries (LDC) negotiating blocs, called on developed countries to uphold the commitments that they made under the Kytoto Protocol – and then re-affirmed in the Bali Action Plan – that they would “take the lead” on tackling climate change.

The lead negotiator from Lesotho, like many delegates from the developing, world took the opportunity to remind other negotiators just exactly what is at stake here: “the failure to combat climate change will increase poverty in my country, and right across Africa. The rights of my people, the rights of people from the most vulnerable countries, are compromised by climate change. We must act now.”

I find these statements incredibly sobering and powerful. What I can’t understand is why these statements, these facts, don’t move those countries who have contributed the most to the climate problem and who have the greatest economic capacity to respond, to really take the lead on climate action?

As I sat in the final plenary, I was struck by the similarity to what was being said here in Bangkok, to what I heard back in Bonn in June, and in August. This made me question – if we are still having the same conversations, have we moved at all on this so called road to Copenhagen?

While there was some minor progress in Bangkok, namely some cautious consolidation of text, (tidying it up, removing repetitions). It seemed that Bangkok, rather that propelling us forward in these negotiations, really laid down the demarcations for the major political battles, or potential roadblocks, that must be tackled over next sixty days as we tick down to Copenhagen.

Read my insights on what these are below, or check out this short video featuring George Woods, International Coordinator for Climate Action Network Australia.

On the major battles front, there are three key questions that have thus far not been answered (though they were thrown around to some extent in Bangkok). Each of these roadblocks need to be addressed, and quickly:

1. What will be the level of Annex 1 ambition for emissions reductions?

While Norway came out with their new emission reduction target of 40% by 2020 during the Bangkok meetings to great applause, by and large the emissions reductions suggested from various Annex I countries are entirely un-ambitious and seem to have little regard for science.

Many targets remain unclear, due to vague (and often unfair) shopping list of conditionalities attached to the offers (including Australia, the EU, New Zealand and Japan); as well as questions around the base year (that is, what year emission reductions should be measured from). Australia measure’s its base year from 2000, rather than the internationally agreed 1990. While this doesn’t translate to a huge difference in emissions: 25% on 2000 levels = 24% on 1990 levels, it does make it confusing and leaves one to question, what other creative mathematics will Australia employ?

At the moment, according to the UNFCCC secretariat (though this is yet to include Norway’s new figure), it’s estimated that the combined Kyoto parties’ ambition is between 15 and 21% below 1990 levels by 2020. This is clearly still outside the Bali range, as well as what science demands (25-40% cuts by 2020). When you add the United States into this mix, the aggregate Annex 1 target has been estimated by AOSIS to be 11-18% reductions by 2020. Even less inspiring.

Alongside a lack of big picture ambition, there continues to be debate around a number of small, but essential areas. So far, it seems we can’t have ambition nor agreement. Countries can’t seem to find a common position on:

i) By what percentage will countries need to reduce their emissions at home and how much of their emissions reduction target will they be able to reduce overseas? (Known as domestic vs. offset);

ii) Should a mid-term review be scheduled, if so, for when? to place the mid-term review (there is a new IPCC report with all of the latest science coming out in 2014. So it would seem sensible to have schedule a review for then, though some countries are pushing for a 2020 review.

iii) Should quantified emission reduction or limitation obligations (which have the ‘roll off your tongue’ acronym of QELROs) be expressed in terms of tons or percentages?

Climate finance: potentially the biggest block of all

2. What scale of finance will be provided for non-annex 1 parties to enable them to undertake adaptation and emission reducing activities, what mechanisms will raise this finance, and what institutional arrangements will deliver it?

I know that I don’t need to go into detail here, you, dear readers, are not only up to date with the latest on climate finance but many of you have taken action, calling on our PM Rudd to break his silence on climate finance.

But, it can’t be said often enough that finance has the potential to make or break these talks. Tackling climate change will be expensive, no one denies that, but it is small change compared to the amount spent by wealthy countries during the Global Financial Crisis, and without money to address climate change, we simply wont make it.

3. How will the two negotiating tracks – the further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol track and the long-term cooperative action convention track – come together?

These are the questions that used to keep just the enviro lawyers awake at night, but now they are on the forefront of most people’s minds: Will there be a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol alongside a new treaty? Will there be a new instrument (or treaty) that supersedes Kyoto?

This has become a highly contentious issue that has divided the G77 + China group and the European Union, Australia, the US and others this session. I have written not one, but two blogs on this topic.

These three are my “hot to watch” predictions for the coming few months, and the areas where we need to see some real action before we get to the two weeks of the Copenhagen talks. This “real action” will need to come in the form of political leadership from those who have been elected to lead their country’s. If the government delegates who attend these meetings are really going to negotiate, they need the green light from their bosses, Ministers and Heads of State first.

So, Bangkok UN climate talks in a nutshell? The next round of talks in Barcelona are going to be #%*ing busy!!!

In my next blog, I’ll look at “where to from here” – with an outline of all of the major meetings between now and Copenhagen where we must see some significant political shifts if we’re going to get an agreement in Copenhagen.