Posts by: Sébastien Duyck

Access a downloadable pdf of this report here.

And there’s more: check also our storify report of the Bonn Climate Talks – Day #1.

Access a downloadable pdf of this report here.

[View the story “Bonn Climate Talks – Day 2 – back to…

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Useful? Then make sure to check our wrap-up of the Bonn Climate Talks – Day #2 (“back to the roots” day).

[View the story "ADP 2014 Climate talks - Day #1 recap" on Storify]

Useful? Then make sure to check…

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This commentary was originally posted as a guest article in iisd’s Climate-L updates.

The players of the COP19 dedicated less energy to short term mitigation ambition than to other issues.Prior to the Warsaw Climate Conference, the release by the IPCC of the first part of its fifth assessment report (‘the physical basis’) was expected to frame the COP 19 discussions and provide a renewed opportunity for science to inform the negotiation process.

In late September, all governments had adopted the conclusions of a scientific report highlighting a stronger than ever confidence on the human contribution to the climate crisis. Most briefings published ahead of COP 19 set the Conference in the context of this renewed call for urgent action.

However, the landfall of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) on the coasts of the Philippines just four days prior to the opening of the Climate Conference contributed to frame the Warsaw negotiations in a different perspective, that of the devastation endured by that country.

The high human price paid by the Philippines contextualized negotiations for the establishment of a loss and damage mechanism, in which the Head of the Philippines delegation, Naderev Saño, played a prominent role. During the following two weeks, this emphasis on loss and damage overshadowed calls for preventive mitigation action.

Nevertheless, two negotiating items provided concrete opportunities for parties to address the principle of preventive action in Warsaw: short term ambition and the 2013-2015 review.

What ambition for mitigation policies during the current decade?

While the reset of the negotiations towards a global climate deal was the most crucial element contained in the Durban Platform, delegates from small islands States insisted that upcoming negotiations under the Durban mandate would consider equally the issue of short-term ambition. This spring, the UNFCCC Secretariat consequently released a comprehensive report evaluating policy options, which could contribute to increase short-term mitigation.[i] During the first negotiating session of the year, small islands States also tabled a proposal for a “technical, targeted and results-oriented” process on renewable energy and energy efficiency.[ii]

In Warsaw, however, the negotiations under this ‘workstream 2′ of the Durban Platform made very little headway. Progress on the issue of HFCs – considered by many as the low hanging fruit among short term ambition options –was blocked as India and Saudi Arabia refused to refer to the opportunity to consider the phasing out of these super-pollutants under the Montreal Protocol. The only minor progress achieved in Warsaw with regards to pre-2020 mitigation ambition was therefore the recognition by countries of the importance to further consider the role of local government in climate policy.

Additionally, negotiators from the most vulnerable countries emphasized in 2012 the inadequacy of the pledges proposed for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and successfully negotiated a mandate to review in 2014 the level of ambition of these commitments. Parties agreed in Warsaw to the modalities of a ministerial roundtable next June that will consider options to enhance the short-term ambition of parties to the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period. While expectations from this roundtable remain very limited, the participation of ministers in such an intersessional session is unprecedented. However, very few commentaries on the state of the negotiations after COP 19 noted this event as one of upcoming milestones in the negotiations process. This lowering of pubic expectations for the ministerial roundtable undermines further the opportunity to make use of the June session to hold European and Australian Governments accountable for the level of their short-term ambition.

Defining the tolerable “dangerousness” of climate change

The Warsaw conference also hosted the second stage of the 2013-2015 review of the long-term global goal (LTGG). As parties endorsed in 2010 a goal of limiting temperature increase to 2˚C, small islands States obtained that the adequacy of this temperature goal would be reviewed, in particular to consider whether an increase of temperature of 1.5˚ C would be sufficient to trigger the “dangerousness” threshold provided by the Convention to define its ultimate objective.[iii]

In practice, the outcomes of the 2013-2015 review might not directly lead to policy changes. Nevertheless, the LTGG does serve as an important goalpost against which collective mitigation ambition is regularly assessed. The review of the LTGG also has direct implications for the short-term mitigation discussion as the 2013 UNEP gap report emphasized that governments would be unlikely to succeed in limiting temperatures increase to 1.5˚C without additional short-term mitigation action.[iv]

While the review attracted very little attention in Warsaw, it will enter in a critical phase in 2014. The report of the second and third working groups of the IPCC will feed into the review’s scientific dialogue, the working group’s focus on impacts and mitigation options increasing the policy relevance of its conclusions. Delegates will also begin to consider the relevance of the review for the negotiations towards the 2015 climate agreement.

A contextual change of focus?

Most analyses published since COP 19 highlighted progress towards the 2015 agreement, loss and damage, and long-term finance as the most important themes of the Warsaw Conference, with occasional references to REDD+ and MRV as additional take-aways. The absence of reference in almost all commentaries – including among the great majority of those provided by advocacy groups – to the issues of short-term ambition and to the 2013-2015 review – indicates a shift of priority not only among negotiators but also more broadly in the public discourses accompanying the process.

Consequent to the adoption of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage in 2013, the issue of compensation for climate damages is unlikely to come back to the forefront of the negotiations until 2016. As the finalization of a global climate agreement will take centre stage at the negotiations in 2015, the coming year offers a last opportunity for the climate negotiations to galvanize support for short-term ambition. Narratives used during the coming intersessional sessions (March and June 2014) will allow to assess whether the strong focus in Warsaw on long-term negotiations and loss and damage was conjectural, or whether actors claiming the high moral ground at the negotiation process have lost faith in the principle that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

[i] UNFCCC Technical paper (May 2013), FCCC/TP/2013/4

[ii] AOSIS non-paper for ADP Workstream 2 (May 2013)

[iii] A recently published paper by James Hansen and others emphasizes for instance that a two degrees objective is inadequate to prevent long-term dangerous climate impacts. See ‘Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change:” Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature,’ James Hansen et al. (December 2013)

[iv] See for instance: The Emissions Gap Report 2013 – A UNEP Synthesis Report (November 2013)

This commentary was originally posted as a guest article in iisd’s Climate-L updates.

Prior to the Warsaw Climate Conference,…

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The Warsaw climate conference, brought down in 10 take aways.The Warsaw climate conference was expected to be the stage for only low-key negotiations with little of the drama involved in some of the previous annual climate conference. The UK energy and climate secretary suggested for instance that one could only hope for “modest progress on modest objectives.” However discussions between key negotiating blocks soon revealed as tensed as feasible in this UN forum. While governments argued over financial transfers, timelines and the terms of a compensation mechanism, representatives from civil society added to the tension, protesting regularly against the hypocrisy of the Polish government and staging an unprecedented walk out from the talks just as negotiations heated up.

Now as the dust settles down, many issues emerge as being part of the COP19 legacy, either resulting in epic rhetorical arguments in plenaries, attracting the ire of observers or consisting of small progress forward.

First, the negotiations confirmed the status of the roadmap towards a Paris agreement, long term finance and the compensation for loss and damage as the most sensitive negotiations items.

While the previous three themes resulted in battles of “fireworks” in plenary sessions, two issues made progress allowing governments to (almost) close two discussions launched in Durban (2010).

In addition, gender and cities advocates obtained breakthroughs for their issues, bringing a much needed breeze refreshing the heavily state-centric context of the talks.

During COP19, three industrialized countries competed for the role of “climate villain of the year”, distastefully backtracking from urgently needed action.

Reflecting back on the outcomes of COP19 but also on the dominating narratives, it seems that a groundswell has displaced short-term ambition as a priority of these negotiations.

  • 1. The more things change the more they remain the same. (2015 climate agreement)

Discussions towards a Paris agreement proved disappointing as negotiators of key countries seemed to come back to pre-2009 positions.Warsaw constituting the halfway milestone on the road to the global climate agreement expected in 2015, the “Durban Platform” negotiations were expected to deliver a crucial roadmap to allow governments to enter into “full negotiations mode” towards the 2015 agreement. These discussions revealed more heated than many had expected, in particularly revealing a wide difference in the interpretation of the negotiations mandate. In the negotiations reset operated in 2011, many saw the end of the infamous “firewall” that divides countries into two categories based on the 1992 membership to the OECD. Meaningful climate action, so the argument went, could only take place in the context of action by both industrialized countries and emerging economies.

While the African group made proposals to operationalize a more subtle differentiation between the obligations of diverse countries, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Singapore (with others less vocal) made it clear that they read the Durban Platform differently, still expecting the 2015 to build on a black-and-white vision of today’s world – thus taking the negotiations back to the dynamics prevailing several years ago. The refusal by lead emerging economies to accept legal obligations under the new agreement led to the replacement in the final decision of the key concept of “commitment” by the much vaguer term of “national contributions”. India found itself in a particularly awkward position, vocally rejecting references to the concept of equity, despite having put all its weight for the inclusion of the concept in the 2010 compromise (I strongly encourage reading this great analysis of India’s struggle by Lavanya Rajamani, arguing that India should wield equity as a sword rather than as a shield).

  • 2. Money makes the world go ’round. (Long Term Finance)

Developed countries failed in Warsaw, once again, to provide guarantees of their intent to deliver on their promises regarding climate finance.Many developing countries had highlighted expectations that COP19 would be a “finance COP”, warning that progress on long term finance would be a prerequisite for constructive negotiations. In Copenhagen, industrialized countries committed to providing 30 billions $ of “fast-start finance” between 2010-2012, and to scale up this effort to reach 100 billions annually in 2020. While industrialized countries claim to have fulfilled their initial commitment, their failure to scale up funding since 2012 – or even to explain how they intend to reach the long term goal of 100b $ – has growingly frustrated negotiators from developing countries.

While a record of seven decisions on climate finance were adopted in Warsaw, developed countries prevented the adoption of a mid-term objective, developing countries having proposed to refer to 70 billions $ by 2016 as a mid-term objective. The current decisions thus establish a process forward but continue to lack an intermediary number. Consequently, the issue of long term finance will remain as the Sword of Damocles over the process, threatening at any point to affect the little amount of trust remaining between developed and developing countries.

  • 3. What comes around, goes around. (Loss and Damage)

The failure of developed countries to adopt adequate mitigation actions led to the continuation of discussions on a compensation mechanism.As part of the Cancun agreements, the most vulnerable countries were successful in securing a decision to consider under the convention the issue of loss and damage resulting from climate change. Developed countries having failed to reduce their emissions adequately, so the argument went, they should compensate most vulnerable nations for the ongoing impacts of climate change. After two years of technical negotiations, the same countries successfully obtained last year a mandate for a dedicated mechanism to be established in 2013. COP19 being so clearly seen as a deadline for the conclusion of these discussions, countries opposing a meaningful loss and damage mechanisms attempted to weaken as much as possible the new mechanism rather than to oppose its establishment frontally.

Consequently, vulnerable countries were successful in securing the establishment of a loss and damage mechanism in Warsaw. This mechanism lacks however the financial resources to support the communities and countries most severely affected by climate change and will therefore mainly be limited to the facilitation of exchange of expertise and to support further research. Furthermore, the US firmly resisted the adoption of the mechanism as a stand-alone instrument, obtaining that the new mechanism would be located within the frame of adaptation. As a result, any financial implications of loss and damage will compete with the limited resources currently available for adaptation (at least until the review of this arrangement in 2016).

  • 4. Money does(n’t) grow on trees. (REDD+)

Negotiators concluded in Warsaw a 6-years long negotiations to develop a framework providing incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation.When negotiations towards a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol were launched in 2007, countries agree on the importance to establish “policy approaches and positive incentives” to promote the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. While a political agreement was reached on the matter three years later as part of the 2010 Cancun agreements, three more years were necessary in order to discuss the details of this framework.

Thanks to additional negotiating time being available to cover this issue (due to the “great Russian freeze” preventing work on other issues), the REDD negotiations made much progress in June 2013, setting the stage for a adoption of a “Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus” which establishes a mechanism for “results-based payments” to developing countries in the context of the demonstrable protection of forests. Importantly for local communities, governments agree in Warsaw that countries should demonstrate that the REDD+ environmental and social safeguards have been applied and respected before they can apply for such funding. Finally, the US, UK and Norway provided 280 millions $ to enable the prompt implementation of the REDD+ framework.

  • 5. What doesn’t get measured doesn’t get done. (Transparency of action, aka. MRV)

Countries also concluded discussions ensuring an international review process to guarantee the transparency of national climate action.In Cancun, countries also accepted that the implementation of national pledges prior to 2020 would go through an international review process – to Measure, Report, and Verify (MRV) emissions – to ensure transparency of action. The Kyoto Protocol included a much stronger “compliance mechanism” to ensure that governments would respect their national targets. As countries decided to move away from such a stringent model, the MRV framework is all that remains to provide an incentive for countries to respect their own engagement as well as to gain confidence that others are doing their share. In Warsaw, negotiators finalized some of the technical aspects of this review, allowing for its full operationalization.

  • 6. Gender isn’t just what’s between your legs, it’s what’s between your ears too. (Gender sensitive policies)

Gender advocates were successful in securing a recognition that gender sensitive climate policies requires more than counting heads at the climate talks.While the UNFCCC already acknowledged the importance of gender balance in decision making in 2001, statistics have shown that little progress has been made at the climate negotiations over the past decade. Last year, gender advocates were successful in obtaining the adoption of a “gender decision” which brought the issue back on the negotiations’ agenda. However, the 2012 decision focused primarily on gender balance, failing to address adequately to the more important issue of the need for gender sensitive climate policies (see a great blog post highlighting why gender balance is not sufficient).

The Warsaw conclusions on gender and climate change constitute a further important step forward as parties better recognize the importance of gender sensitive policies in responding to climate change as well as suggested further steps to be taken, including the adoption of a framework on the issue.

  • 7. City air makes you free. (Local governments’ actions)

For the first time, national governments accepted to consider the contribution made by local governments to the climate response.This year consisted a long expected breakthrough for those hoping to see the UNFCCC better acknowledge the major role played by provinces, regions and cities in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Up to now, and except for a small reference in the 2010 Cancun agreements to the role of sub-national governments, this message had difficulties to find an echo in the UNFCCC process, a space so strongly dominated by state-driven interests.

During COP19, the climate negotiations hosted an unprecedented “cities day” to hear from the experience of mayors and discuss opportunity to better leverage commitments from local governments (the Carbonn Cities Climate registry, despite having only recently being launched, already records over 4000 commitments from cities for short term climate action). Rachel Kyte, Vice President for Sustainable Development at the World Bank, referred to one of the cities event as the ‘can do room at the can’t do summit. Governments consequently agreed to organize a forum on the issue within the context of the workstream on short-term ambition.

  • 8. People that live in glass houses shouldn’t throw big rocks. (Poland: an inconvenient host)

Poland hosted this year's conference with the astuteness of a wrecking ball.The country hosting the COP receives additional leverage to promote its agenda but also comes under additional scrutiny, with both its climate diplomacy and its domestic policies exposed. For two weeks, Poland thus became the centre of public attention. But instead of exercising the balanced facilitation expected, the Polish government opted for a desctructive exercise of rock throwing. From the invitation of some of the most conservative business representatives to take actively part to a ministerial meeting to the sacking of the COP president just as his role became more important to facilitate a compromise, the Polish government did certainly not run out of creativity in its attempts to scupper this year’s climate conference.

But the most damaging moves by the Polish government consisted in the sponsoring of the conference by big climate polluters and the hosting of a “climate and coal summit” parallel to the COP. Both revealing perhaps a little too obviously the level of corporate capture of this year’s conference. These two provocations acted as the proverbial straws that broke the camel’s back, contributing greatly many civil society representatives to walk out of the COP19 in the middle of the proceedings.

  • 9. You can never have a good show without a good (couple of) villain(s). (Australia & Japan backtracking)

Australia managed to overshadow Japan's severe backtracking on its climate target, deserving the title as chief climate villain of the year.While governments represented in Warsaw struggled to find new ambition for climate action among industrialized countries, Japan actually announced on the first day of the negotiations that its government had reconsidered its 2020 target and would replace the current objective of a 25 percent emissions reduction (as pledged under the Copenhagen agreement) by an increase of its emissions by 3 percent. Not even the disputed replacement of nuclear by coal after the Fukushima accidents could explain such an increase of Japanese emissions over the coming decade.

However, Australia managed to exceed Japan’s misconduct, emerging as the most obstructing actor of this conference. Firstly, the newly elected government had announced prior to the Warsaw conference a comprehensive program to dismantle all significant climate policies from its predecessor: including the repeal the carbon price, removal of support for renewable energy, dismantling of the independent Climate Change Authority and a U-turn on a long term target of reducing carbon pollution by 80% by 2050. Secondly, the Australian negotiators prevented progress on several key issues, adopting a particularly obstructive stance on climate finance for instance. Overshadowing Canada as 2013′s chief climate villain, the delegation sent by Prime Minister Abbott received the “Colossal Fossil” anti-award attributed by NGOs to the most unhelpful country at this year’s conference. Adding insult to injury, the Australian delegation faced the wrath of developing countries’ negotiators for its disrespectful attitude during the conference. The government of Tony Abbott already achieved a great blow to the reputation of Australia as a credible international actor.

  • 10. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. (Short term ambition)

COP19 witnessed a shift from prevention (short term ambition) to damage control (loss and damage), both in the political decisions adopted and in the narrative of key advocates.When the decision was adopted in Durban to postpone the entry into force of a global climate agreement to 2020, the most vulnerable countries only accepted this deal on the condition that the need for short term action remains on the agenda of the negotiation with equal attention. These countries knew only too well that the delay embedded in the Durban compromise would turn into a death sentence if governments would not succeeded in increase mitigation ambition before 2020. Judging by the outcomes of the Warsaw conference, but also by the narratives used by many actors, short term ambition seems to have been washed off the negotiating table…

I shared more thoughts on this last issue in a guest post for iisd Climate-L series. Read more here on what I perceive as the most unnoticed, yet perhaps most worrisome COP19 outcome…

The Warsaw climate conference was expected to be the stage for only low-key negotiations with little of the drama involved…

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This post constitutes the second part of an analysis of countries and coalitions’ positions on the 2015 global climate agreement currently under negotiations at the UN climate negotiations. The visualizations below are based on the written submissions provided by countries ahead of the Warsaw climate conference.

This second section provides short analyses of the positions of industrialized countries (NB: these categories are only used here in order to structure the analysis).

For additional background information – incl. a short introduction to the art of reading “word clouds” – and a commentary on the positions of developing countries, please refer to the first part of this analysis.
← return to Part 1 of this analysis

Part 2: Industrialized Countries

US: a “race to the top” lacking a goal post

US elaborates its “race to the top” approach to the UNFCCC, acknowledging might not deliver.
The submission of the United States builds on the country’s proposal for a “race to the top” building on nationally determined pledges and the hope that ambitious action by some will emulate others. The submission acknowledges that this approach provides no guarantee to deliver the level of commitment required to reach the common objective but suggests that pressure will ultimately build on parties to do so.

The country calls for the ongoing negotiations to deliver a concise agreement in 2015 with some details on the rules allowing for a transparent assessment of national action and a mix between binding and aspirational commitments. Mitigation commitments would be registered in a separate schedule, after a consultative phase to begin in March 2015. The submission lists the information that should be provided by parties in order to enable countries to compare their efforts.

Finally, in relation to the role of finance in the post-2020 framework, the US emphasizes the importance of redirecting investment flows and the role that climate finance can play to provide positive incentives for this to happen.

EU: trust as the driver of ambition

The EU calls for strong compliance and transparency to guarantee trust at UNFCCC.
The submission of the European Union (on behalf of 34 countries) emphasizes the need to accelerate the negotiation process. The EU calls for the adoption in 2015 of an ambitious, legally binding protocol with global participation and informed by science. The protocol should be applicable to all on the basis of their “fair share” (defined by the EU as based on evolving responsibilities and capabilities). It also emphasizes its expectation that the negotiations will result in a comprehensive package addressing not only mitigation but also adaptation, means of implementation and transparency.

Where the US and some other developed countries see flexibility and pragmatism as a driver for ambition, the EU emphasizes trust (through the implementation of a robust rules-based system) as the key to delivering stronger mitigation action. It therefore calls for the adoption of a legally binding reporting and accounting framework building both on the Kyoto Protocol and on the processes adopted after the Cancun Agreements, including through capacity building when necessary in relation to reporting obligations.

The block calls for further discussion in November on the operationalization of finance. It suggests that all parties make initial offers in 2014 in relation to their mitigation commitments thus allowing for a step-by-step review process afterwards. Such commitments should be economy wide emissions reductions targets for countries already having such obligations or other types of commitments based on national circumstances for other parties with the objective of seeing all countries eventually converge towards the first type of commitments.

EIG: an ambitious instrument with legally binding commitments for all

The Environmental Integrity Group wants an ambitious instrument in 2015 with legally binding commitments for all UNFCCC.

The Environmental Integrity Group (Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, Rep. of Korea, and Switzerland) is straightforward about its expectations: a legally binding instrument with sufficient ambition, comprehensive participation and effective compliance mechanisms. The five countries emphasize their vision of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility & respective capacities (CBDR/RC) as an enabler for further ambition, based on a “dynamic and flexible framework”.

In relation to mitigation, their submission emphasizes the need for all commitments to take the same legal form and be under the same rules, with the type, stringency and timing of actions varying based on CBDR/RC and equity. The EIG provides additional information in relation to its expectations on accounting, verification and compliance of the commitments. While the group emphasizes the importance to make progress in Warsaw on the modalities and timeline of the consultative phase which would allow the review of national commitments, the countries did not provide further detail their views on this matter.

New Zealand: an ambitious dismantling of the multilateral framework

New Zealand: Flex-i-bi-li-ty as a vision for climate policy.
New Zealand’s position is based on a hybrid approach between a bottom-up approach and a top-down regime, with flexibility as the key word. The limited top-down elements envisioned by the country are an obligation to adopt mitigation actions and a commitment to respect transparency requirements in the reporting of domestic actions. Accordingly, the 2015 agreement would also contain a global aspirational goal and a general commitment for all countries to improve ambition over time. New Zealand rejects any equity formula to assess the adequacy of national actions.

The submission then details the bottom-up elements that the country advocates for: the national determination of actions, based on methodologies chosen at the discretion of each countries, and coupled with the possibility for additional “op-ins” (flexibility mechanisms) and “op-outs” (to exclude one sector from its accounting). In relation to the negotiations timeframe, the country suggests that national commitments be registered sometime after 2015, once a set of conditions is met. No reference is made to guaranteeing that such a hybrid approach would guarantee that countries deliver the final objective of the convention.

Japan: a flexible regime

Japan wants a flexible system with a flexible timeframe.
The Japanese submission suggests taking into account the G8 “proposal” of reducing global emissions by 50% in 2050 (developed countries reducing their own emissions by 80%). The vision of the country for the post 2020 climate agreement is defined as a flexible hybrid system with nationally determined commitments based on internationally-agreed rules. The submission of these commitments would then be followed by an international review process.

The country’s submission provides detailed information on expectations for the “ex-ante” consultation allowing the review national commitments internationally before their inscription in the new agreement as well as on the “ex-post” review of the progress made by countries to implement their commitments. Additional flexibility is suggested by the country in relation to the timeframe for the submission of commitments as well as with the possibility to demonstrate a country’s actions on climate change through other criteria than emission reductions.

AILAC: “means of implementation” as a key enabler

AILAC: means of implementation must be a key enabler in the 2015 climate agreement.

The submission by the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (“AILAC”, composed of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panamá & Perú) focuses on the role of two core elements: the importance of a new framework for adaptation and the role of means of implementation (financial and technological support as well as capacity building) in the new framework. The coalition provides a useful reminder of the role that these resources play in the intergovernmental process: contributing to the achievement of the global goals as facilitating the increase of ambition as well as enabling compliance, for instance in providing resources for countries to implement adequate reporting of their actions. The group suggests that both of those aspects should be considered when defining provisions related to means of implementation in the post 2020 regime. AILAC also emphasizes the importance for negotiations related to means of implementations to follow the same timeframe as the discussions focused on mitigation commitments.

Singapore: championing a purely bottom-up approach

Singapore is championing a purely bottom-up approach towards the 2015 UNFCCC Climate deal.

As one of the richest countries falling outside of the scope of the Annex 1 to the climate convention, Singapore reiterated the importance of building on the structure provided by the Convention and its Annexes in the post 2020 regime. Its submission emphasized the importance of the participation by all countries to the new climate framework as well as the key role of acknowledging national circumstances in achieving this universal participation. The country proposes that national determined mitigation commitments be submitted in 2015. No mention is made in the country’s position to any type of review of these commitments before those are registered in the 2015 climate agreement, thus suggesting a purely “bottom-up” approach.

The author would like to thank those having provided comments since the publication of the first part of this analysis.

Disclaimer: additional parties have also submitted their written position on the 2015 climate agreement. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations’ submission focuses mainly on REDD+ related elements. The Russian position is sadly available only in Russian language. Finally Uzbekistan and Turkey have also contributed in written to this process.

At the time of the publication of this analysis, neither China nor AOSIS (the Alliance of Small Islands States) had provided their written input.

Visualization through word clouds and analysis of the positions of industralized countries ahead of the next round of climate negotiations.

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