Diving into the Draft: What I like and dislike

After waiting for hours, the newest draft document was released at 10:30pm last night. Though I had waited for hours to get our hands on it, I still had the energy to dive into the text.

Here’s my quick and dirty analysis line by line:

Here’s the first alarm bell we see. This second paragraph sounds all good listing mitigation, finance, tech transfer, capacity building and transparency. But did you notice we left out one important line? “adaptation including loss and damage”. For many countries, it is critical that Loss and Damage be treated on its own, separated from adaptation for both practical and financial reasons. I’m guessing this inclusive language sparks a few flames tomorrow, including our own.

I believe these two paragraphs basically say that the submissions countries will be making next year are not legally binding. However paragraph 6 also includes some nice language on encouraging “support” for developing nations to develop both mitigation and adaptation actions. Though we would definitely like some more clarity on what “support” means in implementation.

The paper then outlines some of the “options” different countries could pursue as they decide just how serious they are going to take their INDCs. Option 1 is straight up weak, and just invites countries to submit an INDC. Option 2, asks that the submissions are more ambitious than what countries are doing now. But this Option 3 is by far the most interesting. It’s the only option with specific “contributions” and a time-frame (even though it is only for “parties ready to do so”). I wish my teachers in school set our assignments like that.

“Please hand it in when you’re ready to do so”.

Other than that, this language is a lot weaker than what most NGO’s were pushing for here. It is also a significant step back from the 2nd draft of the text this week that included language like “a quantifiable mitigation component…which represents the highest level of mitigation ambition, beyond its 2020 commitment”. There was also previous language on “equity”, CBDR and the idea of “evolving national circumstances”. Finally, there was a really strong line on “parties with greatest responsibility…are expected to take on absolute economy-wide mitigation targets”…and that others should “aspire to this over time”.

All of that language would have given these paragraphs much more bite. As it stands, this is the best of 3 different options, and it isn’t going to push anyone over the ambition line.

The next section starts to dive into surface-level detail on the type of information different countries should provide with their INDCs.

As you can see, this is what Tuvalu’s Ian Fry likes to call a “shopping list” of information requirements. Here, it is nice to see “reference point”, “quantified outcomes”, “any assumptions” and “land-use accounting”. All of which are additions to the original draft decision text and mean we’re going to get more information to analyse hopefully soon. That is if we get option 3. Option 1 and 2 are annemically weak and wouldn’t tell us anything about different national contexts.

Paragraph 10 then gives us our only reference to any “non-parties” in relation to INDC submissions. While past draft texts have included “civil society”, “indigenous people”, “local communities”, “private sector” and “comparative initiatives” in the introductions of these documents, this small mention of “any other organisations” is all we get in the INDCs. Even this reference makes me think they’re only thinking of the World Bank and the IMF when they talk about “other organisations”. Without reference to “civil society” as well as all the other groups (not to mention YOUTH) we could be walking down the path of a non-transparent or inclusive global agreement - wasn’t the whole point of the Pre-social COP to prevent this?

This again is the best option we have right now. However, again, “civil society” or “NGO’s” are not involved. Here, we’re talking about a review of the INDC pledges made by each country. As mentioned, this is critical to be able to figure out exactly what we have once everyone ideally puts their pledge on the table. We don’t have language encouraging the increase of these pledges, but we do still have some language on “fair and equitable contribution” that could be useful. Though it is sure to scare some developed and developing countries alike in negotiations tomorrow.

I am surprised to see the Technical paper being prepared “prior to 30 May, 2015″ and think this would be really useful if it was possible.

I am saddened though to see that we have lost “the sense of urgency” around the Kyoto Protocol, which is now addressed as something that should simply be encouraged.

I’m guessing you catch my drift when I post “Option 3″ by now. It’s the best case scenario I see, but obviously not always as good as we might have hoped. In this case, the good parts include the title of an “Accelerated Implementation Mechanism.” That sounds like something good to aim for….get it ;)

But being so short on detail, it is hard to see if this could really shift anything significant. Though the repetition of “acceleration” gives this paragraph a good sense of pace across the board. Though I am not sure if its going to inspire the implementation we need.

Again this language is all positive, but very vague, and specifics are what we’re all about here at the UNFCCC. Back on this text part, the emphasis on the technical studies, when it is, it can be writing on anything, yea there was.

These final few paragraphs civil society finally gets a mention. I would have loved to have seen similar language as above “compiling information provided…from observer organisations”. I also like the idea of “advancing the technical examination process”. However, I are not so sure, once again, that there is enough information here to be able to plan to integrate a variety of ideas based on the new agreement.

Paragraph 16 has some strangely sugar-coated language on renaming the COP to the Lima Climate Action High level Meeting. Saying that, I think a lot of countries isn’t really vote, not yet.

Then in the last lines, I am reminded of the Secretariat budget cuts, which resulted in one of the smallest observer organisations groupings here for years.

Lets hope it doesn’t happen again in #COP21. Whether these texts hold or not, I will still have piles of work to do to try and turn this from a lowest common denominator text, to something with real merit.

If this is supposed to get us half-way to Paris, we’ll get stuck before leaving Lima. This text offers very little to a very few. Equity is barely mentioned, but at the same time, even the strongest option texts do little more than nudge countries out of bed, rather than shaking them into action.